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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Supreme Court Case No. 32447, district court case number SP-OT-04-77OD, 
(hereinafter, 32447) and Supreme Court Case No. 34820, district court case number H- 
03-279, (hereinafter, 34820) have been consolidated for appellate purposes. In 34820, 
Max Cooke was convicted of second degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and 
assault, and appeals the judgment of conviction and his sentences for this offense. In 
32447, Mr. Cooke filed a post-conviction action arising from his judgment of conviction 
in 34820. 
Mr. Cooke was convicted by jury verdict of second degree kidnapping, 
aggravated battery, and assault. He received a unified sentence of 25 years, with 12 
years fixed, for his conviction of second degree kidnapping; a sentence of 15 years, with 
7 years fixed, for his conviction of aggravated battery; and a sentence of 90 days, with 
credit for 90 days sewed, for his conviction of assault. 
Mr. Cooke filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to timely file a 
notice of appeal in his case. He further asserted that newly discovered evidence 
regarding Alison ~ooke's' competence as a witness should have been discovered by 
his trial counsel and used during cross-examination, and that this newly discovered 
Alison Cooke is the alleged victim in this case. This Court may wish to note that 
Ms. Cooke appears to have gone by the name Alison Archuleta as of the date of 
Mr. Cooke's post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (9126107 Tr., p.32, L.23 - p.33, L.5.) 
However, because she is referred to as Alison Cooke throughout the remaining 
proceedings in this case, for ease of reference, she will be referred to as Ms. Cooke in 
this brief. 
evidence on its own justified the vacation of Mr. Cooke's conviction and sentence in the 
interests of justice. 
The district court originally summarily dismissed Mr. Cooke's post-conviction 
petition. On appeal, the State asked the Supreme Court to remand the case to the 
district court for a hearing and the Supreme Court granted the State's motion to remand 
the case. Upon remand, the district court found that Mr. Cooke had timely requested 
that his trial counsel file a notice of appeal, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
not doing so. Therefore, the district court vacated its prior judgment of conviction and 
re-entered an amended judgment of conviction so that Mr. Cooke could file his appeal. 
However, the district court found that Mr. Cooke had not established ineffective 
assistance of counsel, or that he was entitled to a new trial based on the evidence and 
arguments presented regarding Ms. Cooke's competence. 
On appeal in 34820, Mr. Cooke asserts that the district court at trial abused its 
discretion when it permitted the State to introduce evidence of Mr. Cooke's prior bad 
acts in the form of alleged threats made by Mr. Cooke over a period of several months 
prior to the actions resulting in the charges at issue in this appeal. As a component of 
this claim, Mr. Cooke asserts that the district court lacked the necessary factual basis to 
conduct a proper balancing of whether the potential for prejudice of these statements 
substantially outweighed their probative value. Mr. Cooke also asserts that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing this evidence during closing arguments as 
proof of Mr. Cooke's bad character and propensity to commit crimes. Finally, he agrees 
that the cumulative effect of the erroneous admission of this evidence, and the 
prosecutor's improper arguments regarding this evidence, deprived him of a fair trial. 
In 32447, Mr. Cooke asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that 
Mr. Cooke did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and was not entitled to a 
new trial, based on information regarding Ms. Cooke's competency as a witness. 
Specifically, he contends that the district court misapprehended the relevant standard 
for competence and made factual findings not supported by substantial evidence when 
the court found that Ms. Cooke was competent to testify at trial and that Mr. Cooke had 
not received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In response, the State asserts that the district court had adequate information to 
make its determination regarding the admissibility of the prior bad acts evidence in this 
case, and that the district court correctly found the prior threats to be admissible. 
Regarding the claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the State responds that Mr. Cooke 
"has failed to cite to any authority for the proposition that it is misconduct for a 
prosecutor to refer to evidence that has been admitted at trial, and therefore has failed 
to properly present this issue for review." (Respondent's Brief, p.18.) In addition, the 
State asserts that Mr. Cooke has failed to establish that any misconduct in this case 
rose to the level of a fundamental error. 
The State further asserts that Mr. Cooke's allegations of error involving his post- 
conviction claims on Ms. Cooke's competence as a witness lack merit because the 
medical evidence did not state that Ms. Cooke would be permanently susceptible to 
false memories, nor did the medical evidence express an opinion on whether 
Ms. Cooke would be competent in the future. Regarding Mr. Cooke's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, the State asserts that the decisions of trial counsel 
regarding cross-examination of witnesses are always deemed tactical and, therefore, 
cannot be "second-guessed" by this Court and that, in any case, the cross-examination 
of Ms. Cooke at trial made by trial counsel was sufficient to explore the issue of her 
competence. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify factual errors in the Appellant's Brief and 
Respondent's Brief; and the further clarify the nature of the allegations being raised on 
appeal and the legal standards attendant to these issues. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
As an initial matter, Mr. Cooke wishes to clarify a misstatement of the record in 
this case that is contained in his Appellant's Brief. The Appellant's Brief indicates that 
the district court failed to give a limiting instruction regarding the appropriate 
consideration of testimony of witnesses at trial regarding prior threats and bad acts that 
Mr. Cooke was alleged to have made. (Appellant's Brief, pp.26-27.) The State correctly 
notes in its Respondent's Brief that the district court included a limiting instruction 
regarding the permissible use of this evidence in its jury instructions. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.19; 34820 R., p.44.) Upon further review of the record, it is clear that this 
instruction was provided to the jury during trial at the close of testimony on June 11, 
2003. (34820 Tr., p.302, 1.18 - p.303, L.4.) As such, Mr. Cooke's prior assertion that 
the district court failed to give a limiting instruction is in error. 
Additionally, Mr. Cooke wishes to clarify that a portion of the statement of facts 
related in the Respondent's Brief were affirmatively rejected by the jury's verdict in this 
case. The Respondent's Brief asserts that Mr. Cooke attempted to rape, and then 
"abandoned his apparent plan to rape," Ms. Cooke. (Respondent's Brief, p.2.) 
However, as was noted in the Appellant's Brief, the jury rendered a verdict that clearly 
deemed these facts not to be established. (Appellant's Brief, pp.23, 37.) The jury 
determined that Mr. Cooke was not guilty of first degree kidnapping and not guilty of 
assault with intent to commit rape. (30187 R., pp.39-40.) They were further instructed 
that the sole fact that would elevate the charge of second degree kidnapping, which the 
jury deemed to have been established, from first degree kidnapping was the 
aggravating facts of either the intent to commit rape or the intent to commit serious 
bodily injury upon Ms. Cooke. (34820 R., pp.47, 50.) The jury's verdicts reflect the fact 
that it considered and rejected, in two separate determinations, the allegation that 
Mr. Cooke had attempted to rape Ms. Cooke. See State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 74, 122 
P.3d 1170, 1174 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The remaining statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Cooke's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 .  Are Mr. Cooke's contentions regarding the district court's abuse of discretion in 
admitting prior bad acts evidence supported by both argument and legal 
authority? 
2. Does the State's response to Mr. Cooke's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct 
misapprehend the nature of the assertion of error being raised, and has 
Mr. Cooke shown that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental 
error? 
3. Does the State misapprehend the nature of Mr. Cooke's allegations made during 
his post-conviction proceedings regarding Ms. Cooke's lack%f competence as a 
witness due to her susceptibility to false memory prior to trial, and regarding his 
trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and take appropriate action 
regarding the issue of her lack of competence? 
ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Cooke's Contentions Regardinq The District Court's Abuse Of Discretion In 
Admittinq Prior Bad Acts Evidence Are Supported Bv Both Arqument And Leaal 
Authority 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Cooke has asserted on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in 
permitting the State to introduce prior bad acts evidence in the form of prior statements 
and threats that Mr. Cooke was alleged to have made even though the prejudicial effect 
of these statements substantially outweighed their probative value if any. As a 
component of his abuse of discretion claim, he further asserts that the district court 
could not properly weigh either the probative value of this evidence or its potential for 
prejudice because the district court lacked necessary information regarding the 
substance, timing, and volume of the past threats that the State was seeking to 
introduce. 
The State asserts that there is not a legal or factual basis for Mr. Cooke's 
assertion in this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-14.) However, the legal standards 
governing prior bad act evidence, the statements of the district court, and the 
application of the law to the facts of this case support Mr. Cooke's contention that the 
district court abused its discretion in admitting these statements. 
B. Mr. Cooke's Contentions Resarding The District Court's Abuse Of Discretion In 
Admittins Prior Bad Acts Evidence Are Supported By Both Argument And Leaal 
Authority 
Mr. Cooke's assertions regarding the district court's abuse of discretion in 
admitting the prior bad acts evidence in this case is supported both by legal authority 
and argument. Moreover, the district court's own concessions regarding its lack of 
information belies the State's assertion that the court possessed sufficient information to 
make an informed decision regarding the admissibility of this evidence in light of the 
applicable legal standards. 
As was noted in the Appellant's Brief, it is well established that a district court, in 
considering whether to admit prior bad acts evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), must consider 
whether the probative value of the evidence that the State seeks to have admitted at 
trial is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, potential to mislead the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
See State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254, 899 P.2d 959, 964 (1995). 
Courts have also recognized that, "the government cannot be permitted to 'flood 
the courtroom' with other-crimes evidence on the excuse that the crime was one of 
specific intent." See State v. Draiman, 784 F.2d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 1986). Other courts 
have similarly noted that reversal of a defendant's conviction may be appropriate "where 
the sheer volume and presentation of otherwise admissible [Rule 404(b)] evidence was 
error." See White v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 470, 477 (Ky. 2005); see also U.S. v. 
Long, 328 F.3d 655, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2003); State v. Hughes, 938 P.2d 457, 466 Ariz. 
1997) (finding an abuse of discretion in admitting prior bad acts evidence where the 
case was "saturated with improper references to defendant's bad character" and 
prosecutor in closing recounted every allegation of prior bad acts as well as 
"descriptions of defendant's threatening personality"). Because it is a case-specific 
determination as to whether the volume of Rule 404(b) evidence will result in undue 
prejudice, the gate-keeping function regarding these issues rests with the district court. 
See Long, 328 F.3d at 664. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting a 
large volume of such prior bad acts evidence where the court individually reviews each 
piece of evidence that the State seeks to admit and evaluates the probative value and 
potential for prejudice of that evidence on a piece-by-piece basis and taking the 
evidence together as a whole. Id. Here, no such individualized evaluation ever 
occurred. (34820 Tr., p.6, L.4 - p.15, L.25.) 
In addition, the gate-keeping function of the district court in considering whether 
to admit prior bad acts evidence includes an examination of the timing of the prior bad 
acts in order to determine whether any relevance has been aqenuated through the 
passage of time. See Sfate v. Ellsworth, 709 A.2d 768, 772 (N.H. 1998); Appellant's 
Brief, p.21. 
With these legal standards in mind, the district court itself noted that it lacked the 
essential information to make an adequate legal determination regarding whether the 
probative value of the evidence the State sought to admit was substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, potential to mislead the jury, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. As was noted in the Appellant's Brief, 
the district court admitted as much on the record in this case. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) 
The district court stated: 
Clearly, any threats made to Alison Cooke are relevant, and I believe their 
probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect in this case. So, those 
statements made over a period of time - you have indicated somewhere 
three to six months prior to this. Again, I don't know how many this 
involves, but, certainly, threats that he made to her that he was going to 
kill her or himself, or both, are relevant. And I can't find that the prejudicial 
effect outweighs the probative value. 
(34820 Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.13, L.8 (emphasis added).) 
The district court had no knowledge of the volume of the material that the State 
was seeking admission of, nor did it have a clear idea of the timing of these statements. 
In light of this, the district court was without necessary information to make an informed 
legal determination regarding the scope and extent of admissibility of these prior bad 
acts. Therefore, Mr. Cooke's arguments regarding the district court's abuse of 
discretion in admitting the prior bad acts evidence in this case are supported both 
legally and factually. The State's assertion to the contrary is in error. 
II. 
The State's Response To Mr. Cooke's Alleqations Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Misapprehends The Nature Of The Assertion Of Error Beina Raised 
A. Introduction 
The State, in its Respondent's Brief, characterizes Mr. Cooke's allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct as proposing that, "it is misconduct for a prosecutor to refer to 
evidence that has been admitted at trial," and further asserts that Mr. Cooke has failed 
to cite any authority for that proposition. (Respondent's Brief, p.18.) This 
characterization fails to grasp the claim that Mr. Cooke is actually making. Mr. Cooke's 
actual assertion is that it was misconduct for the prosecutor, in closing remarks, to urge 
the jury to apply evidence of Mr. Cooke's prior bad acts, that were admitted for the 
limited purpose of showing intent, for the impermissible purpose of showing propensity 
and further committed misconduct by urging the jury to seek to punish Mr. Cooke for 
several prior uncharged allegations of misconduct. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-27.) 
B. The State's Response To Mr. Cooke's Allenations Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Misapprehends The Nature Of The Assertion Of Error Being Raised 
As previously noted, The State characterizes Mr. Cooke's assertion of 
prosecutorial misconduct as proposing that, "it is misconduct for a prosecutor to refer to 
evidence that has been admitted at trial," and further asserts that Mr. Cooke has failed 
to cite any authority for that proposition. (Respondent's Brief, p.18.) This is a 
misapprehension of Mr. Cooke's claim. 
What Mr. Cooke has actually asserted in his Appellant's Brief is that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that evidence, admitted for a limited 
purpose, should be considered by the jury for purposes for which such evidence cannot 
be lawfully considered. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) More specifically, the prosecutor 
in this case argued evidence of Mr. Cooke's prior threats and uncharged allegations of 
prior domestic violence were proof of Mr. Cooke's violent propensities, and the need to 
punish him for these prior and uncharged harms that the State alleged he inflicted on 
his wife. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) 
Mr. Cooke acknowledges the considerable latitude afforded to both parties in 
arguing reasonable inferences from the evidence at trial. See, e.g., State v. Wolfrum, 
145 ldaho 44, 49, 175 P.3d 206, 21 1 (Ct. App. 2007). However, "while the prosecutor 
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 
78, 88 (1935). Accordingly, a prosecutor should not be permitted to make closing 
arguments that encourage the jury to apply evidence in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the law, the rules of evidence, or with the rulings of the district court.* 
The very existence of and purpose of limiting instructions regarding evidence 
admitted for a limited purpose is to clarify that there are some purposes for which this 
evidence should not be used. See, e.g., I.R.E. 105; Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 
561 (1967); State v. Greene, 512 A.2d 330, 333, n.2 (Me. 1986); State v. Guzek, 86 
P.3d 1106, 1121, n.18 (Or. 2004) (overruled on other grounds by Oregon v. Guzek, 546 
U.S. 517 (2006)). Moreover, the purpose of closing arguments is to "sharpen and clarify 
the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case," and to enlighten the jury 
as to how to interpret the evidence. State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 
587 (Ct. App. 2007). It stands to reason, then, that argument by a prosecutor that 
encourages the jury to disregard the limitations placed on the admissibility of evidence 
and to consider the evidence for an improper purpose cannot stand as proper closing 
argument. 
In this case, the prosecutor committed misconduct by encouraging the jury to 
consider the evidence of Mr. Cooke's prior bad acts as evidence of his violent 
propensities and further encouraged the jury to consider uncharged past harms alleged 
to have been done to Ms. Cooke when considering Mr. Cooke's guilt on the charged 
offenses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) While the prosecutor may generally make 
argument regarding admissible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, this 
latitude does not permit a prosecutor to encourage the jury to apply the evidence in a 
See Stafe v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507-508, 988 P.2d 1 170, 1181-1 182 (1999) 
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manner contrary to the law or to a ruling of the district court regarding admissibility of 
that evidence. 
The State Misapprehends The Nature Of Mr. Cooke's Alleaations, Made Durins His 
Post-Conviction Proceedings. Reqardinq Ms. Cooke's Lack Of Competence As A 
Witness Due To Her Susceptibilitv To False Memorv Prior To Trial; And Reqardins His 
Trial Counsel's Ineffectiveness For Failina To Investigate And Take Ap~ropriate Action 
Regardins The Issue Of Her Lack Of Competence 
A. Introduction 
In it's Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that Mr. Cooke's claims regarding 
Ms. Cooke's lack of competence are not well taken because the medical evidence 
presented did not indicate that Ms. Cooke's susceptability to false memory persisted 
through her testimony at trial and, therefore, there was no evidence that she was 
incompetent as a witness at trial. (Respondent's Brief, p.26.) The State further asserts 
that Mr. Cooke has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
pursue issues related to Ms. Cooke's competence as a witness because Mr. Cooke 
didn't establish that Ms. Cooke was incompetent, and because "counsel's cross- 
examination strategy is a tactical decision that will not be second-guessed." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.27.) 
The State's arguments misapprehend the nature of the basis for Mr. Cooke's 
claim that Ms. Cooke was not competent to testify. It is irrelevant as to whether 
Ms. Cooke's condition of being susceptible to false memory would have been reduced 
or eliminated over time if, during the period where she was at high risk to develop false 
memory, she received information from others regarding the substance of her testimony 
at trial and her memory was altered as a result. In such cases, the witness is no longer 
competent to testify because the witness lacks the ability to meaningfully discern what is 
the product of his or her independent recall and what is an artifact of the information that 
he or she received. 
Moreover, the record in this case demonstrates that Ms. Cooke was provided 
with information from outside sources that could have altered her memory and rendered 
her perceived recall unreliable. And there is at least one documented instance in this 
record where she stated as much. 
Finally, the State's assertion that the failure to adequately investigate or cross- 
examine witnesses is never second guessed is not an accurate statement of the law. 
While decisions regarding cross-examination are normally within the purview of 
strategic or tactical decisions, there is no legitimate basis to explain the failure of trial 
counsel to investigate or cross-examine Ms. Cooke regarding her susceptibility to false 
memory. Since such cross-examination would go to the reliability of matters that 
Ms. Cooke testified she did remember, such cross-examination would cast additional 
doubt on her testimony at trial. 
B. The State Misapprehends The Nature Of Mr. Cooke's Allegations Made During 
His Post-Conviction Proceedinas Reaardina Ms. Cooke's Lack Of Competence 
As A Witness Due To Her Susceptibilitv To False Memow Prior To Trial: And 
Regardinq His Trial Counsel's Ineffectiveness For Failina To lnvestiaate And 
Take Appropriate Action Reclarding The Issue Of Her Lack Of Competence 
In his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Mr. Cooke asserted that the 
evidence he presented in support of his petition demonstrated that Ms. Cooke was not a 
competent witness to testify at his trial because she was at risk for false memories. 
(R., p.49.) He also alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 
the issue of Ms. Cooke's potential lack of competence through calling her physician as a 
witness and by failing to cross-examine Ms. Cooke on the issue of false memory. 
(32447 R., p.50.) 
Attached to this petition was a medical report from Dr. Clay Ward, who treated 
Ms. Cooke for her injuries after the crash, that contained the following conclusions 
regarding Ms. Cooke's condition: 
I do not believe that the patient is competent or even appropriate for a 
police or forensic evaluation at this time. She does not have any recall of 
events leading up to the accident and is still very much in posttraumatic 
amnesia. My impression is that her information will likely be misleading, 
unreliable, and she is at risk for developing new memories or false 
memories rather than accurately recalling what happened prior fo the 
impact. 
(32447 R., p.60.) 
That Ms. Cooke's condition of being at risk for developing false memory may 
have changed over time is of no accord if, at the time she was at risk, her memory was 
altered as a result information she had received from outside sources that she then 
conflated as her own memory. As was noted by the concurrence in State v. Giles, 115 
Idaho 984, 772 P.2d 191 (1989): 
Even adults' memory can be tainted to the point that their actual testimony 
is deemed too unreliable to be admitted without offending due process. 
Examples include the tainted identification resulting from an unduly 
suggestive lineup or the effect of hypnosis ... Once this tainting of memory 
has occurred, the problem is irremediable. That memory is, from then on, 
as real to the child as any other. This "confabulation" is precisely the 
problem with hypnotically enhanced memory discussed by this Court in 
lwakiri 
Id. at 990-91, 772 P.2d at 197-98 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
As such, the State's argument that Ms. Cooke may not have been as susceptible 
to false memory at the time she testified is irrelevant. The central consideration 
regarding her competence as a witness is whether she had received false memories 
during the time when she was susceptible. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.30-34.) The 
district court failed to consider this critical issue, and the record in this case supports the 
conclusion that Ms. Cooke's memory had been modified by information she had 
received from outside sources during the period of time that she was at risk for 
developing false memories. 
At one point during Mr. Cooke's hearing on his post-conviction petition, during 
questioning from Mr. Cooke's counsel, Ms. Cooke admitted that she had no recollection 
of the ditch that she and Mr. Cooke went over in his truck. (9/26107 Tr., p.63, Ls.19-21.) 
But she then testified that she did form a recollection of the ditch "from looking at the 
accident scene afterwards." (9126107 Tr., p.63, L.22 - p.64, L.2.) This statement is a 
clear indication that Ms. Cooke had gaps in her memory that had been filled, prior to 
trial, by subsequent information that was received from an outside source. 
Moreover, Ms. Cooke was surrounded by friends and family members for the 
entire time of her hospitalization, and appears to have asked questions regarding what 
had happened to her. (34820 Tr., p.76, L.1 - p.78, L.5, p.128, Ls.1-14.) Ms. Cooke 
also testified at trial that, after she woke up and her family was around her, she started 
to "find out where [she] hurt and what was the matter with [her]," and that when she 
woke up she was unaware of the origin of one of her injuries, and that her knowledge 
was "[jlust what people have told [her]." (34820 Tr., p.351, Ls.2-10, p.354, Ls.5-ID.) All 
of this information from the record, when coupled with the medical evidence in this case, 
demonstrates that Ms. Cooke's recall was likely tainted with information that was 
suggested to her by outside sources, rather than being the product of her own 
perceptions. 
Additionally, the State misstates case law regarding claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel that are based on the allegation of inadequate investigation 
andlor cross-examination. In it's Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that "counsel's 
cross-examination strategy is a tactical decision that will not be second-guessed." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.27.) However, the cases relied on by the State for this 
proposition do not stand for so broad and unrestricted a holding. Upon review of these 
cases, what they actually hold is that such decisions will be deemed tactical unless that 
decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of review. State v. Payne, - I d a h o ,  
- P.3d -, 2008 WL 2447447, * I0  (2008) (decision of what witnesses to call is an 
area that Court will not second guess without evidence of inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation); 
State v. Osborne, 130 ldaho 365, 372-373, 941 P.2d 337, 344-345 (Ct. App. 1997). In 
this case, Mr. Cooke's assertions regarding his trial counsel's failure to seek to have 
Ms. Cooke deemed incompetent as a witness or to cross-examine her regarding the 
issue of false memory are very clearly linked to Mr. Cooke's assertion of inadequate 
preparation by trial counsel. As such, they can properly be examined by this Court. 
Finally, the State's assertion that trial counsel did cross-examine Ms. Cooke 
regarding her "ability to remember details" and the holes in her memory does not 
address the core concerns that are implicated by false memory. As noted by Mr. Cooke 
in his Appellant's Brief, while trial counsel cross-examined Ms. Cooke regarding various 
holes in her memory, the medical report indicating that she was at high risk to develop 
new or false memories would have addressed an additional issue: the reliability of those 
facts Ms. Cooke testified that she did recall. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cooke respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and sentence and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, he asks that this Court 
vacate the district court's order denying him post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 12'h day of December, 2008. 
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